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This experiment investigated the inﬂuence of motor expertise on object-based versus
egocentric transformations in a chronometric mental rotation task using images of either
the own or another person’s body as stimulus material. According to the embodied
cognition viewpoint, we hypothesized motor-experts to outperform non-motor experts
speciﬁcally in the egocentric condition because of higher kinesthetic representation
and motor simulations compared to object-based transformations. In line with this, we
expected that images of the own body are solved faster than another person’s body stimuli.
Results showed a beneﬁt of motor expertise and representations of another person’s body,
but only for the object-based transformation task. That is, this other-advantage diminishes
in egocentric transformations. Since motor experts did not show any speciﬁc expertise in
rotational movements, we concluded that using human bodies as stimulus material elicits
embodied spatial transformations, which facilitates performance exclusively for egocentric
transformations. Regarding stimulus material, the other-advantage ascribed to increased
self-awareness-consciousness distracting attention-demanding resources, disappeared in
the egocentric condition.This result may be due to the stronger link between the bodily self
and motor representations compared to that emerging in object-based transformations.
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INTRODUCTION
MENTAL ROTATION
Mental rotation is a speciﬁc visuo-spatial ability which involves
the process of imagining how a two- or three-dimensional object
would look if rotated away from its original upright orientation
(Shepard and Metzler, 1971). In a classic chronometric mental
rotation task two stimuli are presented side-by-side on a screen.
The left stimulus servers as the “comparison object” presented in
upright orientation, and participants have to decide as fast and
accurately as possible if the rotated right stimulus represents the
same object or a mirror-image of the left object. From trial to trial
angular disparities are varied systematically and response times,
accuracy rate, and often mental rotation speed are assessed as
dependent variables. Shepard andMetzler (1971) showed the reac-
tion time (RT) increased linearly with increasing angular disparity
between the two presented objects.
OBJECT-BASED AND EGOCENTRIC MENTAL TRANSFORMATIONS
In mental rotation there are two different classes of mental
transformation strategies, which seem to represent different cog-
nitive operations: object-based and egocentric transformations
(Zacks et al., 2002a). Whereas in object-based transformations
the observer’s position remains ﬁxed and participants are asked
to mentally move/rotate the object in relation to the surrounding
environment, in egocentric transformation tasks participants are
asked to mentally change their own perspective and thus imag-
ine rotating their own body in order to make a decision which is
a simulative process recruiting representations of our own body
(Devlin and Wilson, 2010; Kessler and Rutherford, 2010). The
use of each strategy depends on the type of judgment that has
to be made: In the case of an object-based transformation two
images are typically presented next to each other and participants
are asked to perform a same–different judgment. An egocen-
tric transformation can be evoked by the presentation of body
stimuli, normally a single human ﬁgure raising one arm (left
or right) appearing at varying orientations and asking partici-
pant to decide which arm was raised (see, however, discussion in
May and Wendt, 2012 arguing that spatial incompatibility effects
might also contribute to such laterality decision tasks). Such task
results in a left–right-judgment from the egocentric perspective
of the ﬁgure (Steggemann et al., 2011). However, according to
Amorim et al. (2006) not only the type of the judgment, but
also the stimulus type affects spatial transformations. In this
study, the authors provided body characteristics to 3D Shephard–
Metzler (S–M) cubes to suggest a human posture to trigger a
body analogy process in a same–different judgment task. They
showed that adding body characteristics to S–M cubes increased
performance compared to the S–M cubes without these charac-
teristics because this spatial embodiment improved object shape
matching.
Evidence from behavioral data conﬁrms the view that object-
based and egocentric transformations are implemented by two
different processing systems. Regarding response time patterns,
there is plentiful literature indicating that perspective transfor-
mations are faster and more accurate than object rotation in
the ground plane (Wraga et al., 1999, 2005; Keehner et al., 2006).
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However, the typical increase of response times with increasing
angular disparity is more evident in object-based transformation
tasks than in egocentric ones (Jola and Mast, 2005; Michelon and
Zacks, 2006). Moreover, Zacks et al. (2002a) did observe no rela-
tionship between mental rotation time and angular disparity in a
left–right mental rotation task.
Besides, this speciﬁc pattern also varies with the view the stim-
ulus is presented from (front vs. back view). Jola and Mast (2005)
showed that RTs and error rates were higher, when the stimulus
was presented in front view (facing the participant) compared to
when it was presented in back view (facing away from the par-
ticipant). Longer RTs are ascribed to the fact that front views
require an additional in-depth rotation compared to back views
where only rotation in the picture plane is required. Regarding
the typical increase of RTs and error rates with increasing angu-
lar disparities, Jola and Mast (2005) found the following pattern
of responses: whereas increasing task difﬁculty with increasing
angular disparities could be replicated for both front and back
views in object-based transformations, for egocentric transforma-
tions this pattern was restricted to the back view. This ﬁnding
conﬁrms the work of Zacks et al. (2002b), who found that perfor-
mance for body ﬁgures in front view did not vary as a function
of rotational angle. However it should be noted, that in this
study ﬁgures were presented in front view only. According to
Jola and Mast (2005), the difference in the angular disparity
effect between back and front view in egocentric transforma-
tions is attributed to the principle of the shortest path rotation
when the ﬁgures are presented in front view, which is supported
by the ﬁnding of fast RTs for upside down body ﬁgures. The
authors assume that no depth rotation is performed to complete
the task, but rather another strategy is employed like a men-
tal ﬂip of an inverted object, as originally assumed by Murray
(1997).
THE INVOLVEMENT OF MOTOR PROCESSES IN OBJECT-BASED AND
EGOCENTRIC TRANSFORMATIONS
Regarding object-based transformations, Shepard and Metzler
(1971) interpreted the linear relationship as a hint that the process
of mentally rotating an object is analogous to the manual rota-
tion of an object, with a limited rotation speed. This assumption
was supported by several ﬁndings:Wohlschläger andWohlschläger
(1998) showed that mental object rotation and actual rotatory
object manipulation share common processes. The activation
of motor, somatosensory, and sensorimotor areas during object
transformations of hands stimuli underlines the idea that these
spatial transformations involve a kind of covert action (Parsons
et al., 1995). This relationship between mental rotation and motor
processes is also supported by the quasi-experimental design of
Pietsch and Jansen (2012) who found a better mental rotation
performance for sports and music students compared to stu-
dents of education science. This effect was further speciﬁed by
a training study of Moreau et al. (2012). The authors investi-
gated the effect of a 10-month wrestling training compared to
a running training of equal duration to compare an activity
that does require mental rotation of bodies with an activity that
does not. Wrestlers showed a signiﬁcant improvement of men-
tal rotation performance compared to runners. This underlines
the notion that enhanced mental rotation performance results
from a higher cognitive plasticity induced from motor training
containing spatial manipulations of bodies. For egocentric tasks
the involvement of speciﬁc motor representations also plays an
important role. For example, Steggemann et al. (2011) assessed
participants with and without motor expertise for rotational
movements (gymnasts, trampolinists, and judoka) and showed
that the beneﬁt of motor experience was restricted to egocentric
transformations. Hence, we predicted that motor-experts should
outperform non-motor experts for the egocentric transforma-
tions (Hypothesis 1), but not necessarily for the object-based
transformations.
Even though both egocentric and object-based transformations
share the involvement of motor processes, they differ in a cru-
cial point, which is illustrated by the study of Lorey et al. (2009).
According to the authors, ﬁrst person perspective (1PP) imagery
evokes kinesthetic representations and motor simulations. In this
kind of imagery participants are requested to imagine the pre-
sented movement kinesthetically as if they were performing it.
This 1PP task was compared to a third person perspective (3PP)
imagery condition which involved only a visual representation of
an action. It was shown that the integration of proprioceptive
information by involving different hand positions is more rele-
vant for 1PP imagery than for 3PP imagery. This result can be
explained in the framework of embodied cognition. The key idea
of this renewed viewpoint in cognitive neuroscience is that many
cognitive processes that were formerly deﬁned as purely “cog-
nitive” are also deeply rooted in body-related experiences with
the environment (Wilson, 2002). Since a 1PP is more embod-
ied, which means that it evokes motor simulation to a higher
extent than 3PP imagery, proprioceptive information is more
relevant for this certain kind of imagery (Gallese, 2003, 2005).
This is in line with the work of Kessler and Thomson (2010)
who conducted four experiments and compared spatial perspec-
tive transformations (Exp. 2) and mental object rotation (Exp.
3). By observing a robust effect of the congruence between body
posture and direction of mental self-rotation they showed that
mental object rotation is either not embodied or very differently
embodied. That is, participants responded faster when their body
posture was matching with the implied rotation direction. This
ﬁnding is supported by neuroimaging ﬁndings of Wraga et al.
(2005) who showed different underlying neural structures for
object-rotation versus perspective transformations: during object
rotation, pre- and primary motor areas were activated which are
responsible for motor-representations that reﬂect manipulation,
whereas perspective transformations relied on both motor areas
that are involved in actual bodily movements (Zacks and Mich-
elon, 2005) and on proprioceptive and perceptual information
(Tversky and Hard, 2009; Kessler and Rutherford, 2010; Kessler
and Thomson, 2010). Further evidence is provided by Surtees
et al. (2013) who used body posture to examine whether spa-
tial perspective judgments and visual perspective judgments were
equally embodied. Former involved left–right-judgments where
the participant is required to mentally occupy another’s position
in space by deciding if an object was placed to an avatar’s left or
right, whereas visual perspective-judgments demand representing
another’s point of view by judging how a number appeared to
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the avatar. Even though both types of judgments used embodied
self-rotations, the effect was signiﬁcantly stronger in spatial per-
spective taking. Based on these ﬁndings that argue for egocentric
transformations to be more embodied, we predicted that motor
experts would outperform non-motor experts especially in the
egocentric condition (Hypothesis 1). Note that we argued here
from an embodied cognition approach to derive this hypothesis,
although there are clearly other possible arguments and potential
causes leading to similar hypothesis, as discussed, e.g., in Zacks
et al. (2002a).
THE INFLUENCE OF THE SELF ON OBJECT-BASED AND EGOCENTRIC
TRANSFORMATIONS
It is currently an open question if the performance in egocen-
tric transformations differs when the body of an unknown person
or one’s own body is presented during a mental rotation task.
Neuropsychological and neuroimaging studies (Devue et al., 2007;
Frassinetti et al., 2008) revealed a clear distinction between the
processing of one’s one body and the body of others by show-
ing that the recognition of the own body is independent from
that of other person’s body. Furthermore, Frassinetti et al. (2008)
observed a certain self-advantage, expressed by faster RTs and a
higher accuracy in self-related body stimuli. This ﬁnding stems
from a matching task where participants were required to decide
which of two vertically aligned images matched to the target stim-
ulus presented in the middle. Performance was better when they
had to match their own body parts compared to others’. This is in
line with the results of Parsons (1987) who showed that familiarity
reduces RTs in left–right-judgments of hands and feet. However,
Ferri et al. (2011) showed that this self-advantage is restricted to
implicit recognition of the self and does not emerge when explicit
self-processing is required. In the implicit recognition participants
had to indicate the laterality (left or right) of the depicted body
stimuli, which were either self or other’s hands presented in front
view under different angular disparities. In the explicit recognition
condition participants were required to recognize their own hands
among other people’s hands. The authors concluded that this self-
advantage in the laterality judgment task is due to the simulation
of a motor rotation of one’s own body part that is required to solve
the task which is in line with the embodiment approach.
GOALS AND HYPOTHESES OF THIS STUDY
The goal of this study was to investigate the mental rotation
performance of egocentric versus object based transformations
in motor-experts compared to non-motor experts. In line with
Steggemann et al. (2011), we used human bodies as stimulusmate-
rial with the modiﬁcation that we used images of both one’s own
body and of another person’s body. In line with the embodied cog-
nition viewpoint, relative to the performance of the non-motor
experts, motor experts should show improved performance in the
egocentric transformation task as it is assumed to be more embod-
ied, but not in the object-based task, which was not expected to
have a strong embodied component (Hypothesis 1). That is, we
expected a stronger effect size of the main effect for the factor
“group” in the egocentric conditions compared to the object-
based ones. Since“front view”, which means facing the participant,
requires an additional in-depth rotation to match the participant’s
orientation, performance should be slower overall for the front
view as compared to the back view (Hypothesis 2, cf. Jola and
Mast, 2005). Furthermore, in line with the embodied cogni-
tion viewpoint we hypothesized that the front-view-disadvantage
should be diminished in motor-experts compared to non-motor
experts. Note that this interaction between “view” and “group” is
expected to be more pronounced for egocentric transformations,
which are assumed to be more embodied and therefore motor
simulation is required to a higher extent compared to object-
based transformations (Hypothesis 3). Regarding the distinction
between stimuli using the own versus another person’s body, we
expected a self-advantage resulting in faster RTs and a higher accu-
racy (Hypothesis 4). However, this self-advantage should be more
pronounced for egocentric transformations, and less pronounced
or even reversed for object-based transformations (Hypothesis 5).
That is, we expected a more pronounced main effect for the fac-
tor “stimulus type” in the egocentric conditions compared to that
in the object-based transformations. Finally, based on the ﬁnd-
ings of Wohlschläger and Wohlschläger (1998) we predicted that
larger angular disparities would yield reduced task performance,
reﬂected in increased RTs and reduced accuracy rates (Hypothe-
sis 6). However, there is plentiful evidence that this performance
decrease for increasing angular disparity is less pronounced for
the egocentric transformation task (cf. Zacks et al., 2002a; Creem-
Regehr et al., 2007). Based on this, we predicted a stronger linear
decrease of task performance (higher RTs and error rates) with
increasing angular disparities in the object-based conditions com-
pared to egocentric transformations (Hypothesis 7). Based on the
ﬁndings of Jola andMast (2005), for object-based transformations,
we predicted decreased task performance with increasing angular
disparities for both front and back view, whereas for egocentric
transformations this speciﬁc pattern is only expected for the back
view (Hypothesis 8).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Eighty-nine adults between 18 and 32 years old participated in this
study, 42 motor experts recruited from an athletic group (mean
age = 22.43, SD = 1.9) and 39 non-motor experts referred to
as the non-athletic group (mean age = 22.67, SD = 2.7). The
motor experts differed from non-motor experts in the amount
of training sessions by practicing more often (4.9 times/week on
average, SD = 1.3) than the non-athletic group (1.03 times/week,
SD = 0.96), F(1,80) = 206.46, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.74. Regard-
ing intelligence, participants showed comparable scores (mean
IQA = 117.31, SDD = 17.06,mean IQNA = 111.05, SDNA = 12.23),
t(79) = 1.88, n.s., measured by using the Number Connection Test
(Zahlenverbindungstest; ZVT; Oswald and Roth, 1987). Forty one
males and 40 females took part in this study. Participants partici-
pated as part of a University course. None of the participants have
participated in mental rotation tests before. All participants gave
informed consent prior to participating.
APPARATUS AND STIMULI
Zahlenverbindungstest (ZVT; Oswald and Roth, 1987)
Cognitive processing speed was assessed by the Number Con-
nection Test (ZVT; Oswald and Roth, 1987). In total, the test
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administration, including instructions andpracticematrices, takes
about 10 min and consists of four sheets of paper. On each sheet,
the numbers 1–90 are presented in a scrambled order in a matrix
of 9 rows and 10 columns. The participants are required to connect
the numbers as fast as possible in ascending order, and the time
needed for the correct connected numbers was analyzed. From
the obtained ZVT-scores, IQ values could be estimated. The cor-
relation ranged between r = 0.60 and 0.80 (Vernon, 1993). The
internal consistency as well as 6-month test–retest reliability of the
ZVT is about 0.90–0.95.
Mental rotation test
For the mental rotation task the experiment was run on a laptop
with a 17′′ monitor located approximately 60 cm in front of the
participants using the software “Presentation” (Neurobehavioral
Systems) for presenting the stimuli. Regarding the experimental
stimuli, there were four conditions, two object-based and two ego-
centric ones which were in turn split into two further categories,
speciﬁcally “self” and “other”: (1) object-based-other, (2) object-
based-self, (3) egocentric-other, (4) egocentric-self, presented in
four separate blocks, as illustrated in Figure 1.
OBJECT-BASED VS. EGOCENTRIC TRANSFORMATIONS
For the object-based task, two pictures of the same kind of stim-
uli were presented side-by-side in the centre of the computer
screen (see Figure 1, left). The two stimuli were presented pair-
wise in ﬁve different angular disparities of 0◦, 45◦, 90◦, 135◦
or 180◦, in which the right stimulus was obtained by the rota-
tion of left stimulus, the so-called comparison ﬁgure. Half of
the trials displayed pairs of identical objects and half displayed
mirror-reversed objects, resulting in a same–different judgment.
In the egocentric condition only one ﬁgure was presented in one
of the rotation angles mentioned above (see Figure 1, right).
This ﬁgure raised either the left or right arm and was depicted
FIGURE 1 | Examples of the stimuli used for the different conditions.
Top stimuli show pictures of participants’ own body, whereas bottom
stimuli depict gender-matched other’s body. Left: sample stimuli used in
the same–different object-based transformation task, for disparities of 45◦
(top) and 90◦ (bottom). Right: stimuli used in the egocentric transformation
task, where participants were asked to judge whether the depicted ﬁgure
has their left or right arm outstretched.
in both front and back view. Therefore, a left–right decision is
required. All stimuliwere rotated in thepicture plane in a clockwise
direction.
SELF VS. OTHER TRIALS
In the“self” trials, the experimental stimulus consisted of an image
of their own body. To this end, we took a picture of each par-
ticipant wearing standardized clothes, namely blue trousers with
black shirt and socks (see Figure 1, top). The session took place in
a controlled setting with constant artiﬁcial lighting. Participants
were photographed from a ﬁxed distance and in the same posi-
tion with one outstretched arm (either left or right), and either
from a frontal or back perspective. This resulted in a total of four
pictures taken of each participant: 2 arm (left/right) × 2 view
(front/back). Thereupon, photographs were modiﬁed with Adobe
Photoshop software to ensure a completely white background. In
contrast to this condition, the “other” trials consisted of pictures
of another person that was matched in gender and clothes, see
Figure 1 (bottom).
PROCEDURE AND EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
The individual testing session took place in a quiet room at the
University of Regensburg and lasted about 60 min. After pictures
were taken from each person, they were adjusted and added to
the stimulus presentation software “Presentation” while partici-
pant completed the demographic questionnaire, followed by the
Number Connection Test (Oswald and Roth, 1987).
Subsequently, the mental rotation test with standardized task
instruction was conducted. In the two object based conditions,
participants had to press the left mouse button (left-click) when
the two stimuli were “same” and the right mouse button (right-
click) when the two stimuli were“different”. “Same”means that the
right stimulus was identical (i.e., not mirror reversed) to the left
comparison stimulus, whereas“different”implies that the stimulus
on the right side was a mirror version of the left stimulus. The
“object-based self” condition contained two pictures of the own
body, whereas in the “object-based other” trials, two pictures of
another person were presented.
In the egocentric conditions (self/other), participants were
required to press the right mouse button if the depicted ﬁgure
raised their right arm or the left mouse button in the case of
outstretching their left arm (see Jansen and Kaltner, 2014). Anal-
ogous to the object-based conditions, either the own or the body
of another person was depicted.
The chronometric mental rotation test consisted of four blocks
which were presented in randomized order. Ten practice trials
preceded each block. During the main experiment, every 20 trials
a pause of 15 s was given. Each trial began with a ﬁxation cross for
1 s. After that, the pair of stimuli in the object-based condition or
a single ﬁgure in the egocentric condition appeared and stayed on
the screen until participants answered. Feedback was given only
in the practice trials. For correct responses a “+” appeared in the
center of the screen and for incorrect responses a “–” appeared.
The next trial began after 1500 ms.
Each participant performed four blocks of 80 experimen-
tal trials, resulting in 320 trials: 2 transformations (object
based/egocentric) × 2 stimulus types (self/other) × 5 angular
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disparities (0◦, 45◦, 90◦, 135◦, or 180◦) × 4 repetitions of each
combination × 4 stimuli per block (front vs. back view × left vs.
right arm raised). Within each block the stimulus presentation
order was randomized.
Two repeated analyses of variance were conducted, with “reac-
tion time” and “accuracy rate” as dependent variables, and with
“angular disparity” (0◦, 45◦, 90◦, 135◦, 180◦), “stimulus type” (self
vs. other), “view” (front vs. back), and “group” (motor experts vs.
non-motor experts) as between-subject factors. The factors“angu-
lar disparity”, “stimulus type,” and “view” were the within-subject
factors, “group” served as between-subject factor. We analyzed
“object-based,” and “egocentric” transformations separately due
to differences in several aspects: visual stimulation (2 stimuli vs. 1
stimulus, cf. Zacks et al., 2002b), type of judgment (same–different
vs. left–right, cf. Steggemann et al., 2011), and instruction (Borst
et al., 2011). For RT only the responses for the non-mirrored tri-
als were analyzed because angular disparity is not clearly deﬁned
for mirror reversed responses (Jolicoeur et al., 1985). Data of ﬁve
people had to be excluded because their RT differed more than
3 SDs from the mean for the speciﬁc stimulus. The signiﬁcance
levels of the analyses of variance results were Bonferroni-corrected
to compensate for potential non-sphericity of the data.
RESULTS
REACTION TIME
Object-based transformations
Regarding RT, the repeated-measures analysis of variance
revealed three signiﬁcant main effects for the factors “view”,
F(1,79) = 27.12, p ≤ 0.001, η2p = 0.26, “angular disparity”,
F(1,79) = 235.02, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.75, and “stimulus type”,
F(1,79) = 15.50, p = < 0.001, η2p = 0.16. As illustrated in
Table 1, mean RTs were higher for the front view (M = 1247.6 ms,
SD = 39.5 ms) than for the back view (M = 1180.3 ms,
SD = 36.4 ms), t(80) = 5.19, p ≤ 0.001, conﬁrming the back-
view-disadvantage predicted in Hypothesis 2. Regarding the main
effect of the factor “angular disparity”, post hoc pair-wise compar-
isons showed higher RTs for each consecutive angular disparity
(p ≤ 0.001), providing overall conﬁrmation for Hypothesis 6.
The main effect of “stimulus type” indicates that participants
took longer to solve the self-condition (M = 1268.9ms, SD= 45.9)
compared to the other-condition, (M = 1158.9 ms, SD = 32.9),
t(80) = –3.97, p ≤ 0.001, cf. Table 1. Note that this other-
advantage is the opposite of the self-advantage we predicted in
Hypothesis 4.
Furthermore, there were two two-way interactions:
(1) The interaction between “view,” and “stimulus type” reached
signiﬁcance,F(1,79)= 4.61, p = 0.035,η2p = 0.06, see Figure 2.
Post hoc tests showed that the response timedifference between
the front and the back view was signiﬁcantly larger for self-
stimuli than for “other”human ﬁgures. That is, front view was
processed more slowly than the back view for both “other”
stimuli (M front = 1181.8 ms, SD = 33.9; Mback = 1135.9 ms,
SD = 33.2) and“self” stimuli (M front = 1313.3 ms, SD = 49.5;
Mback = 1224.6 ms, SD = 44.1). However, this differ-
ence was more pronounced when images of the “own” body
(Mdiff = 90.2, SD = 18.9) were used instead of another
person’s body (Mdiff = 46.3, SD = 13.7), in the sense
of an “own-body-front-view-disadvantage,” t(80) = -2.19,
p = 0.032.
(2) The “view” × “angular disparity” interaction was signiﬁcant,
F(1,79) = 2.40, p = 0.050, partial η2p = 0.03, and is illustrated
in Figure 3. There was a bigger RT difference between angular
disparity of 45◦ and 90◦ in the front view compared to that
in the back view, t(80) = 3.3, p = 0.001. Overall, however,
response times show a fairly similar monotonic increase with
angular disparity for both front and back view which partly
corroborates Hypothesis 8.
Egocentric transformations
Regarding RT, the repeated-measures analysis of variance
revealed three signiﬁcant main effects for the factors “view,”
F(1,79) = 178.53, p ≤ 0.001, η2p = 0.69, “group,” F(1,79) = 8.45,
p ≤ 0.001, η2p = 0.09, and “angular disparity,” F(1,79) = 267.97,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.77, as illustrated in Table 1. Participants took
longer to solve the front view (M = 1146.9 ms, SD = 38.3 ms)
than for the back view (M = 902.8 ms, SD = 24.9 ms),
t(80) = 12.87, p ≤ 0.001, conﬁrming the front-view-disadvantage
also found in object-based transformations. Interestingly, for
the object-based conditions the effect size for comparing front
vs. back view was r = 0.62 (d = 1.57), whereas the effect
Table 1 | Main effects for the factors “group”, “view,” and “stimulus type” for object-based and egocentric transformations (mean RT and SE).
Transformation
Main effect Object-based Egocentric
Group Motor experts 1220.9 ms (51.9) n.s. 942.0 ms (41.1) *
Non-motor experts 1206.9 ms (53.9) 1114.1 ms (42.6)
View Front 1247.6 ms (39.5) ** 1146.9 ms (38.3) **
Back 1180.3 ms (36.4) 902.8 ms (24.9)
Stimulus Other 1158.9 ms (32.9) ** 1029.2 ms (30.9) n.s.
Self 1268.9 ms (45.9) 1026.9 ms (30.9)
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.001; n.s. = non-signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level.
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FIGURE 2 | Reaction time (mean and SE) dependent on view and
stimulus type for the object-based transformations. *p < 0.05.
FIGURE 3 | Reaction time (mean and SE) dependent on view and
angular disparity for the object-based transformations. *p < 0.05.
size for the factor “view” in egocentric transformations was
much stronger with r = 0.96 (d = 0.62). The main effect of
“group” indicates that motor-experts (M = 942.0 ms, SD = 41.1)
solved egocentric transformations faster than non-motor experts
(M = 1114.1 ms, SD = 42.6), t(80) = –2.91, p = 0.005.
Note that this result corroborates the prediction of Hypothe-
sis 1. Regarding the main effect of the factor “angular disparity”
(cf. Figure 4), RTs in the egocentric condition did not dif-
fer between angular disparities of 45◦ and 90◦, t(80) = –1.29,
p = 0.119. Furthermore, by trend RT in the egocentric trans-
formation condition surprisingly decreased between the angular
disparity of 0◦ and 45◦. That is, whereas RTs in the object-based
condition roughly increased linearly with increasing disparity as
expected, they showed a U-shaped pattern for the egocentric
transformation condition. Increasing disparity in the egocen-
tric task only led to higher response times for disparities larger
than 90◦. All other effects did not reach signiﬁcance at the 0.05
FIGURE 4 | Reaction time (mean and SE) dependent on angular
disparity for object-based and egocentric transformations.
FIGURE 5 | Reaction time (mean and SE) dependent on view and
group for egocentric transformations. *p < 0.05.
level. In comparison with the roughly linear increase of response
time with “angular disparity” in object-based transformations,
the observed U-shaped pattern for egocentric transformations
provides support for Hypothesis 7, which predicted that the small-
angle-advantage should be more pronounced for the object-based
transformations.
Furthermore, there were two two-way interactions:
(1) The interaction between“view”and“group” reached signif-
icance, F(1,79) = 6.16, p = 0.015, η2p = 0.07, see Figure 5. Post hoc
tests showed that the difference between the front and the back
view is signiﬁcant larger for non-motor experts (M = 291.4 ms,
SD = 26.5) than for motor experts (M = 200.1 ms, SD = 25.5),
t(80) = –2.48, p = 0.015. That is, front view was processed
slower than the back view in both motor experts (M front = 1042.0,
SD = 50.8; Mback = 841.9 ms, SD = 33.5) and non-motor experts
(M front = 1259.8 ms, SD = 52.7; Mback = 968.4 ms, SD = 34.7),
but this difference between front and back view is reduced in
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motor experts. Since this interaction is restricted to egocentric
transformations, this result is in line with Hypothesis 3, where
we predicted that the front-view-disadvantage should be dimin-
ished in motor-experts compared to non-motor experts, especially
for egocentric transformations, which are assumed to be more
embodied and therefore motor simulation is required to a higher
extent compared to object-based transformations.
(2)The“view”×“angular disparity”interactionwas signiﬁcant,
F(1,79)= 30.62, p< 0.001,η2p = 0.28, and is illustrated inFigure 6.
Regarding the back view, post hoc tests showed a linear increase of
RTs (p < 0.001) for angular disparities larger than 45◦. The RT
difference between angular disparity of 0◦ and 45◦ was not signif-
icant, t(80) = –1.06, p = 0.291. Interestingly, RT in the front view
surprisingly decreased between the angular disparity of 0◦ and 45◦,
t(80) = 8.14, p< 0.001. RTs for angular disparities of 45◦ and 90◦
did not differ, t(80) = –1.29, p = 0.199. From angular disparity
of 90◦ on there is a linear increase between successive increasing
angular disparities (p < 0.001), resulting in an U-shaped pattern.
This result provides some support for Hypothesis 8.
ACCURACY RATE
Object-based transformations
The repeated-measures analysis of variance score showed one
main effect of the factor “angular disparity” on accuracy rates,
F(1,79) = 8.94, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.10, as illustrated in Figure 7.
Bonferroni corrected t-tests revealed a signiﬁcant decline in accu-
racy between angular disparities of 90◦ and 135◦, t(80) = 3.38,
p = 0.001. None of the other differences between consecutive
angular disparities reach signiﬁcance, though. Thus, the accuracy
data provided only some support for the small-angle-advantage
predicted in Hypothesis 6. All other effects failed to reach sig-
niﬁcance at the 0.05 level. Hence, the accuracy data provided no
support for Hypotheses 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, or 8.
Egocentric transformations
The repeated-measures analysis of variance revealed two signiﬁ-
cant main effects for the factors“view”, F(1,79) = 20.87, p ≤ 0.001,
FIGURE 6 | Reaction time (mean and SE) dependent on view and
angular disparity for egocentric transformations.
FIGURE 7 | Accuracy rate (mean and SE) dependent on angular
disparity for object-based and egocentric transformations. *p < 0.001.
η2p = 0.21, and “angular disparity,” F(1,79) = 9.47, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.11. Participants made more errors when solving the front
view (M = 91.1%, SD = 1.2) compared to the performance
in the back view condition (M = 95.1%, SD = 0.8), t(80) =
–4.54, p < 0.001, conﬁrming the front-view-disadvantage pre-
dicted in Hypothesis 2. Regarding the main effect of “angular
disparity” (cf. Figure 7), Bonferroni corrected t-tests revealed that
accuracy signiﬁcantly declines between angular disparities of 135◦
and180◦, t(80)=4.08,p<0.001. This result in partly corroborates
Hypothesis 6.
DISCUSSION
In the context of the embodied cognition approach, we com-
pared the performance of motor experts and non-motor experts
in object-based versus egocentric transformations with a speciﬁc
focus on the distinction between “self”- and “other” body stimuli.
Our main results were that motor experts outperformed non-
motor experts regarding RT, but only in the egocentric condition.
This result corroborates Hypothesis 1. With respect to view, we
observed a front-view-disadvantage which is expressed by higher
RTs for stimuli facing the participant for both object-based and
egocentric transformations. Regarding accuracy rate, front view
elicited more errors than the back view in the egocentric trans-
formation task. These ﬁndings provide evidence for Hypothesis 2.
We do not refer this decreased front view performance to a conﬂict
in response-stimulus mapping because it occurred in both object-
based and egocentric transformations. Otherwise, only egocentric
transformations where laterality judgments are required should
have been affected. Interestingly, the front-view-disadvantage was
reduced in motor-experts, but only for egocentric transforma-
tions as predicted in Hypothesis 3. Concerning stimulus type, for
object-based transformation tasks another person’s body stimuli
seem to be transformed and processed faster than those of own
body stimuli, which is contradictory to Hypothesis 4. However,
this other-advantage was not observed for egocentric transforma-
tion tasks. This ﬁnding is in line with further analyzes comparing
“self”-stimuli in both transformations. Since the other-advantage
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diminishes in egocentric transformations, this ﬁnding provides
some support for the effect predicted in Hypothesis 5. Further-
more, increasing angular disparities overall lead to higher RTs
which conﬁrms Hypothesis 6. Additionally, this effect was depen-
dent on the kind of transformation and more prominent for
object-based transformations. This corroborates Hypothesis 7
and is in line with Zacks et al. (2002a) who found no correla-
tion between mental rotation time and angular disparity in an
egocentric mental rotation task. By taking the view into account,
the effect of increasing difﬁculty with increasing angular dispari-
ties was prominent for both back and front view in object-based
transformations, whereas in egocentric transformations no such
linear increase could be observed for the front view. This conﬁrms
the work of Jola and Mast (2005) and provides some support for
Hypothesis 8.
THE INVOLVEMENT OF MOTOR PROCESSES IN OBJECT-BASED AND
EGOCENTRIC TRANSFORMATIONS
While motor experts performed faster than non-motor experts in
the egocentric transformation condition, no such advantage was
found for the object-based transformation condition. This seemed
to be in contrast to the positive inﬂuence of long-term physical
activity on object-based transformations reported by Pietsch and
Jansen (2012). This positive effect was speciﬁed by the ﬁndings
of Moreau et al. (2012) showing that training which promotes
rotational movement (wrestling) promotes mental rotation per-
formance to a higher extent than training in running. Similarly,
Jansen et al. (2009) found a positive effect of juggling training
on mental rotation performance. In consideration of the fact
that (1) these results are restricted to object-based mental rota-
tion tasks and (2) it is evident that object-based and egocentric
transformations seem to be two dissociable processes, it raises
the question whether the inﬂuence of motor expertise on mental
rotation performance differs between egocentric and object-based
transformations. This is the main issue raised by Steggemann et al.
(2011), who showed that motor expertise improves mental rota-
tion performance, but only when an egocentric transformation
was induced. However, this advantage was restricted to upside-
down body orientations, which are unfamiliar to non-experts.
Accordingly, motor experts beneﬁted from their body representa-
tion in different orientations both through adopting all of these
orientations during training and through watching other motor
experts performing same movements. Since our results reveal
that motor experts outperform non-motor experts in egocen-
tric transformations without any speciﬁc expertise for rotational
movements, this suggests that motor expertise must not neces-
sarily be speciﬁc to beneﬁt mental rotation performance. This
corroborates the notion that the stimulus type is essential, con-
ﬁrming ﬁndings of Amorim et al. (2006). Their data suggested
that adding a human head to S–M cubes elicits embodied spatial
transformations which facilitate performance in a same–different
mental rotation experiment compared to abstract S–Mcubes. Sim-
ilar results are provided by Jansen et al. (2012) who compared 20
soccer players and 20non-athletes in a same–differentmental rota-
tion task with both cubed and embodied ﬁgures. They observed
slower RTs and mental rotation speed for cube ﬁgures compared
to embodied stimuli. Furthermore, motor experts showed a better
performance than non-motor experts, but only for embodied
stimuli.
Based on the notion that egocentric transformations evoke the
simulation of one’s body, a better proprioceptive integration of
motor experts compared to non-motor experts could be a fur-
ther explanation of why they showed performance differences
only for egocentric transformations. Jola et al. (2011) conducted
three different conditions to differentiate proprioceptive, visual,
and proprioceptive combined with visual information. Compar-
ing dancers and non-dancers revealed that dancers show a better
integration of proprioceptive signals than non-dancers. This is in
line with the work of Kessler and Thomson (2010) who compared
egocentric transformations with object-based ones. Using direct
posture manipulations, they showed that object-based trans-
formations were not embodied in the same way as egocentric
transformations.
It still remains unclear, though, whether a general increased
expertise in motor imagery of motor experts leads to advantages
in perspective transformations. Motor imagery is a widespread
technique in motor experts attempting to improve their perfor-
mance (Feltz and Landers, 1983). It is quite obvious that motor
imagery differs for a low-skilled individual compared to a highly
skilled athlete (Milton et al., 2008). However, further research is
needed to clarify whether experience in motor imagery beneﬁts
this speciﬁc kindof perspective transformation and throughwhich
mechanisms this advantage is induced. The notion of a higher
automatization of motor imagery resulting in a lesser resource-
allocation through attention-demanding processes could provide
a hypothetical chain to explain a better performance of motor
experts compared to non-motor experts.
These considerations of the embodied viewpoint approach
could also provide evidence for the ﬁnding of a diminished
front-view-disadvantage of motor experts solely in egocentric
transformations. Adapting the front view requires an additional
in depth-rotation and therefore higher RTs (cf. Jola and Mast,
2005). We conclude that the observed diminished front-view-
disadvantage of motor-experts for egocentric transformations
might be ascribed to their training in motor imagery (Milton et al.,
2008) and/or their kinesthetic experience (Kessler and Rutherford,
2010; Kessler and Thomson, 2010; Jola et al., 2011).
Next to these routes for increasing involvement of body-related
representations during egocentric transformations, individual dif-
ferences should also be taken into account. Note that next to
motor and proprioceptive signals, vestibular information is also
playing an important role in egocentric transformations. The
work of Rieser et al. (1986) showed that participants did not lose
the track of their visuo-spatial perspective even in the absence
of sights and sounds. Furthermore, Lopez et al. (2008) investi-
gated patients suffering from autoscopic phenomena, which is an
illusory own body perception of the whole body resulting from
a failure to integrate multisensory information (proprioceptive,
tactile and vestibular) and in addition from a deﬁcit to integrate
visual and vestibular information. According to Anzellotti et al.
(2011) these patients perceive themselves and the environment
from a perspective outside of their physical body in terms of an
“out-of-body experience” (parasomatic visuo-spatial perspective,
disembodied location). Therefore, unity between the body and
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the self is disrupted (Braithwaite et al., 2013). Here, a paranor-
mal activity of vestibular-related areas like the temporo-parietal
junction was found which underlines the importance of vestibu-
lar processing in body ownership and embodiment (Blanke and
Arzy, 2005; Lopez et al., 2008). Interestingly, Zacks et al. (1999)
found that the parietal-temporal-occipital junction is also an area
specialized for egocentric transformations. In addition, there is
plentiful evidence that these dissociative body-related experiences
refer to similar brain areas like egocentric transformations (Kessler
and Rutherford, 2010; Kessler and Thomson, 2010; Kessler and
Wang, 2012).
Interestingly, the strength of embodiment is dependent on two
further modulating variables: gender and culture. Kessler and
Wang (2012) re-analyzed data from Kessler and Thomson (2010)
who deﬁned the strength of embodiment as body-posture congru-
ence effects. Kessler and Wang (2012) investigated sex differences
and social skills in embodied processing and found that females
with high social skills (“embodiers”) outperformedmales with low
social skills (“systemisers”). The authors ascribed the decreased
performance for systemisers in embodied processing to either an
inclined tendency to switch to different strategies, for example
those used for object-based rotations, or to a reduced efﬁciency
in adopting the view of another’s person. Similarly, a cultural
difference in perspective taking could be shown by Kessler et al.
(2014). The authors hypothesized that people from cultural back-
grounds where a social orientation towards others rather than to
the self is prominent like in East-Asia aremore efﬁcient in adopting
someone else’s view and therefore in egocentric transformations
compared to Westeners who are assumed to be more self-related.
In addition, sex differences were also investigated. They found that
East-Asians showed an advantage in embodied processing, espe-
cially pronounced for females. The authors emphasized that the
interpretation of culture-speciﬁc ﬁndings should take gender as
modulating factor into account.
According to the embodied viewpoint, egocentric transforma-
tions considered as emulations of a body rotation should emerge
especially when actual mental rotation is performed. This is
increasingly likely when task difﬁculty rises, that is when angu-
lar disparities are increasing. Interestingly, regarding this speciﬁc
pattern, there is some evidence that object–based transformations
show a linear increase of RTs with angular disparity (Shepard and
Metzler, 1971; Zacks et al., 2002a; Jola and Mast, 2005; Michelon
andZacks,2006) due to theprinciple of equivalence to real rotation
of the object (Shephard and Cooper, 1982), whereas in egocentric
transformationsRTsonly start to get higher at angles above 60◦ and
90◦ (Keehner et al., 2006; Michelon and Zacks, 2006). According
to Kessler and Thomson (2010), this egocentric-speciﬁc diver-
gence could be ascribed to the use of different strategies for small
and large angular disparities. On the one hand, smaller angles
seem to be solved with a visual matching process. This assump-
tion is conﬁrmed by the work of Kozhevnikov and Hegarty (2001)
who observed that participants tended to turn their head instead
of mentally rotating the stimulus for angles below 100◦. This
strategy especially facilitates performance at low angles in left–
right-judgments, where the stimulus’ left and right matches the
participant’s body parts. On the other hand, according to Kessler
and Thomson (2010) decreased performance at larger angles can
be ascribed to the increasing mental effort for embodied trans-
formations. Since RTs of our study start to increase at angular
disparity of 90◦ after a decrease between the angles 0◦ and 45◦
in the egocentric condition, whereas a linear increase is observed
in the object-based transformations, our data seems to support
the use of different strategies depending on the angular dispar-
ity. Note that there are several further approaches for explaining
differences in the angular disparity effect of egocentric and object-
based transformations (cf. Jola and Mast, 2005). However, as the
focus of the current paper is on the embodied cognition viewpoint
we do not discuss them here in more detail.
THE INFLUENCE OF THE SELF ON OBJECT-BASED AND EGOCENTRIC
MENTAL TRANSFORMATIONS
In contrast to Frassinetti et al. (2008) and our Hypothesis 4, both
claiming a self-advantage for mental transformations, we found
that stimuli of another person’s body are solved faster than images
of the own body in the object-based transformation task. We ten-
tatively propose that facing an image of the own body activates
self-awareness processes, which distract attention from the men-
tal rotation task, thus resulting in slower reactions. According to
Gallagher (2005), the body image includes beliefs, attitudes, and
perceptions about the own body. There is evidence that an exper-
imental stimulus like a mirror increases attention to aspects of
the self (Froming et al., 1982). According to Karadi et al. (2001),
focused attention is one of several sub-processes playing an impor-
tant role in mental rotation performance. Mental rotation itself
involves active manipulation of visual representations, which is
presumably more of a controlled process of voluntary attention
than an automatic one. This may lead to the conclusion that atten-
tional control is reduced through self-related thoughts evoked by
facing the own body. Interestingly, taking the view into account,
the “front-disadvantage,” expressed by higher RTs for the stim-
uli facing the participant, is more pronounced for self-stimuli
than for other stimuli, which could provide some further support
for the self-awareness explanation. Even though it might seem
like a reasonable proposition that own-body stimuli increase self-
related thoughts and thus attentional demands, which in turn can
reduce mental rotation performance, it remains unclear why this
effect should be restricted to object-based transformations andnot
occur for egocentric transformation tasks. This has to be investi-
gated in further studies. To determine the extent of the self-related
distraction our experimental design could be supplemented by a
recognition task using images of the own and another person’s
body.
Interestingly, the other-advantage disappears in egocentric
transformations, which could be interpreted as kind of a self-
advantage in egocentric transformations. This is in turn in line
with the ﬁndings of Ferri et al. (2011) showing that self-advantage
occurs in implicit recognition of the self where a motor rota-
tion of the own body parts induced by a laterality judgment
is required. Additionally, the authors found that motor sim-
ulation is not required to accomplish the explicit recognition
task. Both ﬁndings were interpreted to the effect that the bod-
ily self is linked to motor representation. Since our egocentric
transformation task also includes a left-right-judgment of body
parts we propose that implicit recognition is comparable with our
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egocentric transformation task. Furthermore, explicit recognition
seems to be related to the object-based condition. In the former
one, participants were asked to judge whether the displayed hand
corresponded or not to their own hand depicted under various
orientation. Even if the same-different judgment of object-based
transformations is based on the comparison of two stimuli pre-
sented simultaneously, the explicit recognition task also requires
an indirect comparison of the mentally presented own hand and
the one depicted in the task. Besides, in explicit recognition task
no motor simulation is assumed which is also in line with our
object-based transformations. The ﬁndings of Ferri et al. (2011)
showing that visuo-motor representation of one’s ownbody is cru-
cial for the self-advantage support our assumption that egocentric
transformations are more embodied than object-based ones. This
in turn could explain why the other-advantage was restricted to
object-based transformations and therefore indirectly argue for a
self-advantage of egocentric transformations. However, it has to
be noted, that Ferri et al. (2011) used body parts (hands) as stim-
ulus material, whereas in our study the whole body was depicted.
To this point it still remains an open question whether the extent
of egocentric transformations being embodied is depending on
the stimulus material used (body parts vs. whole body). Future
research should announce this differentiation of stimulus material
against the background of embodied transformations.
Further evidence is provided by the work of Tsakiris (2010).
Here, participants were required to recognize their own right
hand under own and another person’s hand stimuli both cov-
ered with gloves. At the same time their own right index ﬁnger
was displaced by either the experimenter or the own left hand.
Recognition performance improved when the displacement of the
own right index ﬁnger was self-generated. According to Gallagher
(2005), such a kind of bodily consciousness is described as body
schema. In contrast to a similar, but distinct consciousness-related
concept, speciﬁcally the body image, the body schema is not only
sensory-motor but also motor-related and outside of intentional
awareness. According to Gallagher (2005), this distinction ﬁnds
empirical support in a double dissociationof neurology. For exam-
ple, it is assumed that people with hemisphere neglect who are not
aware of the left part of their body suffer from an impaired body
image, whereas deafferented patients receiving neither tactile nor
proprioceptive information from body areas below the neck show
a disruption of the body schema. Both theoretical concepts in
combination with their empirical ground in neurology could pro-
vide interesting research issues in the mental rotation paradigm
where the bodily self seems to play an important role.
LIMITATIONS AND CONCLUSION
Since our results are not in line with previous studies emphasiz-
ing the meaning of speciﬁc expertise, the notion that not only
motor expertise, but also visual experience plays an important
role could be crucial. For further studies, an additional control
group who is not familiar with these movements could be helpful
for a more detailed understanding. In addition, to clarify to which
extent both speciﬁc expertise and stimulus type inﬂuence spatial
transformations, a further study might be conducted comparing
rotational motor experts, general motor experts, and non-athletes
using our stimulus material. However, showing that egocentric
transformations are more embodied than object-based ones by
using a group-effect of motor expertise is a much more indirect
way thanmanipulating the body’s posture. Thus,manipulating the
body’s posture is better approach, and might be a more promising
avenue for further research. Regarding the inﬂuence of the self on
object-based and egocentric transformations, brain imaging stud-
ies suggest that the body stimuli used in our study are not directly
comparable with hand stimuli, as cortical area in the visual cor-
tex can be selective to the processing human bodies (“extrastriate
body area”, cf. Downing et al., 2001).
In conclusion, our results show that the link between the bodily
self and motor representations according to the embodied cog-
nition viewpoint not only occurs in visual recognition but also
in higher cognitive processes such as mental rotation. Embodied
mental rotation thus proved to be an interesting research topic that
deserves further attention, especially in the context of the bodily
self.
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